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COMMENTARY 
THE HIGH PRIESTS QUESTIONED OR 
AT LEAST CROSS-EXAMINED 
Larry I. Palmer* 
EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS: THE AUTHORITY OF 
THE INVESTIGATOR, SUBJECT, PROFESSIONS, AND STATE IN 
THE HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PROCESS. By Jay Katz 
with the assistance of Alexander Capron and Eleanor 
Glass. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972. Pp. 
xlix, 1159. $20.00. 
I. 
A host of questions that lawyers assume to be important in book 
reviews are irrelevant in understanding and appreciating this brilliant 
work. A lawyer might well ask whether this book is a contribution 
to the field of "Legal Medicine" or "Law and Medicine." Or, if the 
questioner is an academic lawyer, he might ask whether this book makes 
a contribution to solving the problems encountered in teaching interdis-
ciplinary approaches in law schools. But the intelligent, well-versed 
layman's query, "what problems do Katz (the physician-psychiatrist) 
and Capron and Glass (his lawyer-collaborators1) seek to address in 
this book?" is more to the point. Yet even this question may lead to a 
superficial analysis, for, at first blush, the book appears to deal solely 
with new therapeutic and experimental techniques used on humans as 
patients and subjects. Doctors, biological researchers, and technocrats, 
however, are not the only modem day high priests challenged in the 
• Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law at Camden. A.B. Harvard; 
LL.B. Yale. 
1. See I. KATz, ExPERIMENTATION WITII HUMAN BEINGS: THE AUTHORTIY OF 
THB INVESTIGATOR, SUBJECT, PROFESSIONS AND STATE IN TilE HUMAN ExPERIMENTATION 
PROCESS x-xi (1972) [hereinafter cited as KATZ]: 
I began work on the book seven years ago with my colleague and friend 
Richard C. Donnelly. His tragically premature death, shortly after we had 
embarked on our initial explorations, made me proceed alone, though in recent 
years with the able assistance of Alex Capron and Eleanor Glass. And, from 
the beginning, an ever-renewing collaboration was established with iny students 
at the Yale Law School who contributed much to the development and revi-
sion of the book's many drafts. 
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book. To this order of high priests belongs any definable group that 
is given authority, because of its "expert" knowledge, to investigate 
other human beings or act in their behalf. As individuals seeking to 
improve the human condition, lawyers, legal researchers, and social 
science researchers must be grouped with doctors, scientists, and tech-
nocrats as the high priests who are systematically questioned and cross-
examined by Katz. 
To comprehend this work, the reader must first exorcise himself 
of any preconceived notion of the definition of human experimenta-
tion. 2 The sheer variety of materials-selections from medicine, psy-
choanalysis, biology, appellate opinions, legislative hearings, and philo-
sophy, to name a few-is an indication that human experimentation 
resists easy categorization. But Katz need not categorize. Rather, as 
indicated by the subtitle, his approach is one of process. And while 
many social values must be examined, Katz ultimately achieves his 
goal of teaching students from a variety of disciplines to ask and subse-
quently resolve questions about the human experimentation process. 3 
The book's brilliance is found in its asking the tough questions, 
both explicitly and implicitly, through the organization of the materials. 
Those seeking to treat the subject matter systematically will welcome it. 
Those readers looking for ready answers will be disappointed. But 
all readers, especially lawyers, should be prepared to cross-examine 
their own notions and perspectives on most human experimentation prob-
lems before undertaking Katz's quest for the tough and unanswerable 
question. 
To bridge the gap between Katz's unique perspective and that of 
most lawyers, I shall include in this essay traditional assumptions about 
book reviews. Thus the contents and analytical structure of this mas-
sive book will be described in varying degrees of detail. As I describe 
the content I will attempt to delineate some of the questions I believe 
Katz is asking. My purpose is to demonstrate to those who might be 
reluctant to use the book in law school how intellectually enriching this 
book can be for law students. In so doing I hope to encourage more 
extensive use of this text and similar texts4 in the training of lawyers. 
I shall conclude with a short epilogue in which I attempt to answer the 
more typical questions raised at the beginning of this essay. I also 
2. Id. at 3. 
3. ld. at 5. 
4. See, e.g., R. DoNNELLY, J. GoLDSTEIN, & R. ScHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAw (1962); 
J. GoLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, TH1l FAMILY AND THE LAw (1965); J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN 
& A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1967). 
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hope to raise some questions (and by no means all of them) that 
lawyers must address after a systematic study of Katz's work. 
II. 
Unlike the method of most law school texts, Katz's approach is to 
set forth his analytical perspective on the problems of human experimen-
tation in the five page introduction. Although some law teachers might 
object to this straightforward approach of "laying it (the 'law') out," 
they need not worry that the "law of human experimentation" is spelled 
out for the student. Rather, the series of questions posed in the intro-
duction serve as the means of integrating the book's four parts and as an 
explanation of the long subtitle. Part one, entitled "An Introduction to 
the Human Experimentation Process,"5 provides an analytical framework 
for examining the tough problems that follow. Once the reader is equip-
ped to ask questions in Katz's fashion through a study of part one, he is 
prepared to question the investigators of modem society (the high 
priests) in a sympathetic and objective manner in part two. Thus this 
section is entitled "The Authority of the Investigator as Guardian of 
Science, Subject and Society."6 Part three, in line with the subtitle, is 
entitled "The Authority of the Subject as Guardian of His Own Fate."7 
This section contains three chapters on the problems of consent. The 
role of the state and recognized social authority is examined in part four. 
This part, entitled "The Authority of Professional and Public Institu-
tions,"8 contains material on many pressing problems such as experimen-
tation on prisoners and dying patients and the development and market-
ing of new drugs. 
Although the important questions that the reader will face through-
out the materials are set forth in the main introduction or the introduc-
tory sections to each part, the law teacher and students need not worry 
about boredom. On the contrary, this straightforward approach 
to the questions asked in the book is necessary in light of the wide 
range of materials examined. Unless the law teacher has ready an-
swers to such questions as: 
6. To what extent and for what purposes should a coexisting in-
tention to give or receive "benefits" affect the authority of 
decisionmakers? 
a. Who, and by what standards, has the authority to decide 
whether an intervention is "beneficial"? 
5. KATZ at 7-280. 
6. Id. at 281-520. 
7. Id. at 521-724. 
8. Id. at 725-1108. 
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b. Should any constraints imposed on the participants in ex-
perimental settings apply equally to therapeutic ones?9 
he need not worry about boredom. Questions like these can be asked, 
re-asked, and traced systematically through the entire book. To the 
high degree of intellectual integration of vastly different materials 
achieved by the author, the law teacher must add a particular perspec-
tive of law as a process of intervention into the existing social mechanism 
of control and noncontrol. As a law teacher examines these materials 
with law students, he will have to ask what goals were sought and what 
results were achieved by the particular form of legal intervention or 
non-intervention into the human experimentation process.10 
Chapter one, "The Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital Case,''11 is 
the perfect case to introduce human experimentation as a process. 
This, however, is no ordinary first case in a law school text. The ex-
periment in question, the injection of "live cancer cells" into some 
patients of the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, has many of the ele-
ments of the human experimentation process subsequently discussed 
in the book. A researcher, who is associated with both a university and 
a famed research institute, is given permission by the hospital medical 
director to experiment in a therapeutic setting. Through a series of 
bizarre events, a lawsuit is brought by a member of the hospital's board 
of directors, and the researcher and medical director are disciplined by 
the state's medical licensing board. Shortly after the researcher and 
the medical director are found to have conducted themselves unpro-
fessionally in failing to obtain "proper consent," the researcher is elect-
ed president of the American Association of Cancer Research. 12 The 
reader is left with the ironic feeling that legal intervention in the 
form of professional disciplining had little, if any, effect upon research-
ers as a group. 
While there are many facts that would justify calling the disciplin-
ary procedure unfair, 13 if all the participants were acting in good faith, 
some even more troublesome questions arise. The researchers had pre-
viously conducted the same experiment, without complaint or apparent 
harm, on dying cancer patients and healthy prisoners.14 Did those prev-
9. ld. at 4. 
10. See note 4 supra. 
11. KATZ at 9-65. 
12. ld. at 65. 
13. There was evidence from other researchers in the field that indicated that the 
failure to tell the patients that the injections were "live cancer cells" was proper. 
This was because the present state of scientific knowledge indic~tes that cancer could 
not be transmitted from one human to another through the injection. See id. at 50-52. 
14. /d. at 34-36. 
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ious experiments go unquestioned because the subjects were people who 
nobody knew or cared about? More disturbing is the possibility that the 
desire to find a cure for cancer is an implicit authorization to some 
physician-medical researcher to experiment on human beings. Was 
this researcher and medical director labelled "immoral" or "unprofes-
sional" solely to protect the rest of us from knowledge that human beings 
must be used in man's apparently humane quest for the cure of a dreaded 
disease? 
A lawyer might chuckle as he reads chapter one, but the other intro-
ductory case study in chapter two will not prompt smug laughter, for 
lawyers, legal researchers, and social researchers are the high priests 
questioned in "The Wichita Jury Recording Case."15 As a different 
case study in the human experimentation process, chapter two raises the 
following blunt question: is it possible that legal and social researchers 
from the prestigious University of Chicago violated deeply felt societal 
norms in their investigation of a legal institution? This chapter, in-
volving the "recording" (read modernly "wiretap") of civil jurors (read 
in Katz's view "human subjects") without their or the litigants' know-
ledge, does tend to suggest that some unarticulated social values were 
violated in the famous Chicago jury study. After an investigative 
hearing, Congress made the recording of jury deliberation a crime. 
Such congressional action might be viewed as a social decision that im-
portant societal values were violated during the research. 
The reader should not, as I initially did, dismiss the hearing be-
fore Senator Eastland's Internal Control Subcommittee as simply an ex-
ample of the 1950's anti-intellectualism.16 Instead, the legal interven-
tion during the research project raises serious questions about the poli-
tical climate necessary for social science research. A careful reading 
of the materials indicates that the researchers redefined the purposes of 
their research project during the hearings. When the project was 
formulated, the goal was to study the "justice or injustice" of the jury 
system. 17 Given this research design, it was entirely possible that re-
searchers could, in good faith, have recommended that the jury system 
be abolished. But after the limited recording of some jury deliberation 
became public, the project's goal was consciously or unconsciously re-
formulated. Under intense public criticism in the press and question-
ing from legal investigators, the researchers claimed repeatedly that 
their research purpose was to strengthen the jury. 18 
15. Id. at 67-109. 
16. See, e.g., id. at 86. 
17. Jd.at68. 
18. See, e.g., id. at 83, 85, 95. 
242 RUTGERS • CAMDEN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:237 
From a purely methodological point of view, one might wonder 
about the effect on the researchers of the legal condemnation of some 
of the investigative techniques. While that academic question might 
interest persons from many disciplines, lawyers and law teachers must 
start facing tougher questions. For instance, is it possible that the 
seminal work on the American jury19 subsequently published by the 
legal and social researchers is not a "scientific" study because the re-
searchers' objectivity was affected by irrelevant considerations?20 It 
is easy for me as a lawyer to point ·the finger at medical researchers 
in chapter one and think that they need constraints on their research 
efforts. I do not, however, find the thought that someone ought to 
place restraints on me, a legal researcher, an easy issue to face. But 
by facing the question early in this volume, the reader will realize in 
a tentative fashion that law might be a constraint on legal and social 
science research as well as medical science research. 21 Chapter two 
introduces a more disturbing problem for lawyers who think law pro-
vides or can provide the proper control mechanism for problems in 
human experimentation. Given my question about the "scientific" ob-
jectivity of the Chicago jury study, one wonders whether (in order to 
be as objective as possible) the investigator must operate in secret and 
without nonscientific influences during the research process. 
The other chapters in part one are excellent complements to the 
two case studies in the previous two chapters. Chapter three, an ex-
amination of the impact of social dynamics on human experimentation, 
is divided into three parts. 22 By beginning in part A with an examina-
tion of the value structure that supports "Man's Quest for Knowledge 
and Mastery,"23 chapter three begins to furnish the reader with informa-
tion that he can use to refine his somewhat diffuse questions about the 
two introductory case studies. After all, it was the quest for knowledge 
about legal institutions and a dreaded disease that motivated the hu-
man experiments in the previous chapters. Although there is not a 
19. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). For a vigorous and 
well reasoned dissent from the accepted view that THE AMERICAN JURY is a seminal 
work, see Walsh, The American Jury: A Reassessment, 79 YALE L.J. 142 (1969). 
20. Ordinarily one might not be concerned about academic questions of this nature. 
This study, however, has had more than academic effect. THE AMERICAN JURY was 
heavily relied upon in the United States Supreme Court's determination that the jury 
was "fundamental" to the administration of the crinlinal law. Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 u.s. 145, 157-58 ( 1968). 
21. Cf. Zeisel, Reflections on Experimental Techniques in the Law, 2 J. LEGAL 
Snmms 107 (1973). See also KATZ at 734-35. 
22. KATZ at 111-235. 
23. ld. at 112-48. 
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single selection from legal materials in part A, I believe lawyers will 
want to read this section. Besides simple intellectual curiosity, prac-
ticality should prompt the lawyer to read this section since the values 
discussed, such as "faith in progress," may influence legal decisions. 
The possibility that scientific values will influence legal decisions be-
comes a certainty if the reader continues to part B, on "Man's Willing-
ness to Risk Human Life."24 By dealing primarily with the congres-
sional hearings on the health and safety of coal miners, the organiza-
tion of materials suggests that it may be the legislative process that 
compromises the value of human life with other social values. If we 
ask the traditional question of whether the legislature ought to pass 
legislation to protect the health and safety of coal miners, our answer 
would obviously be "yes." But the reader is given enough materials 
at least to question the traditional response. By studying the ma-
terials carefully, the reader discovers another more fundamental ques-
tion. After the legislature has spent nearly twenty years trying to de-
termine what health and safety standards will save the lives of coal 
miners, why do coal mine disasters still occur? While we are critical 
of non-enforcement of safety laws when human lives are lost in mine 
disasters, we cannot explain why the public supports or allows such 
non-enforcement. 25 Since the reader is already acquainted with the 
value structures of scientists and technologists because of part A, he 
might wonder if legislatively enacted health and safety standards are 
somehow inappropriate. 26 Or, since lawyers are part of this scientifi-
cally oriented society, we might think that more public health research 
is necessary before the right kind of legislation can be enacted. But, 
before further research projects are proposed, lawyers might consider 
whether law can achieve the result of preventing death or ill health in 
coal mines when a variety of actors-the miners, the operators, the soc-
iety generally-are willing to risk human life in order to achieve other 
social goals. After all, we all need the energy supplied by the coal 
miners' labor to live comfortably in our technological world. I wish 
the book offered some real reassurances that we have even the ca-
pacity to see the social dynamics of this and other so called environmen-
tal problems. 27 Rather the book offers only Professor Calabresi's ad-
monition: 
24. Id. at 149-84. 
25. ld. at 174-75. 
26. Id. at 168. 
27. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rule, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972). 
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Our society is not committed to preserving life at any cost. In 
its broadest sense, the rather unpleasant notion that we are willing 
to destroy lives should be obvious.28 
If you find distressing the notion that our legal institutions provide 
the means for society to risk human life in certain enterprises, part C, 
on "Man's Readiness to Delegate Authority to Experts,"29 will not sit 
well with you. From specialized knowledge and expertise come the 
notions of professionalism. 30 Just as the scientist demands the right to 
work in isolation, the professional demands the right to develop stand-
ards to govern his own conduct and the authority to exclude others. 
The three sections of the chapter make sense only if one asks whether 
society authorizes the professionals to risk human life. The sec-
tions on doctor-patient relationships seem to be quite pertinent to this 
question. The selections dealing with new roles for lawyers are re-
minders that in experimenting with new professional roles for law-
yers, we are in a sense experimenting with human beings. 31 But to 
say that there is an experiment to ascertain the best way to deliver 
legal services and to develop methods of professional control over law-
yers is not necessarily to condemn this legal experiment. 
In chapter four on "Perspectives on Decisionmaking,"32 Katz puts 
together readings from economics, political science, philosophy, and 
jurisprudence that might provide a basis for legal decisionmaking about 
the human experimentation process. The clear indication is that there 
is presently no model of how law should or should not intervene 
in the human experimentation process. The explanation of this state 
of affairs may lie in law's inability to define its purposes in intervention. 
If the book has any definite point to make it is clearly presented 
in part two. Katz seems to be saying to lawyers, and to the professions 
generally, "Do not think you have adequately defined your professional 
authority as investigators." I say the message is directed to lawyers be-
cause chapter five, "Experimentation without Restriction," involves the 
alleged "crimes against humanity" by Nazi doctors. 33 While Katz 
specifically states in his preface that these cases of human experimenta-
tion originally inspired the casebook, the point not to be missed is 
that the experiments were "not isolated instances of 'crimes against 
28. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ANALYSIS 21 
(1970) (excerpted in KATZ at 177) (footnotes omitted). 
29. KATZ at 185-235. 
30. Id. at 186-96. 
31. Id. at 234. 
32. Id. at 237-80. 
33. Id. at 283-321. 
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humanity.' "34 Furthermore, several human beings, Nazi doctors and 
scientists, were hanged for following state authority instead of their 
"professional code" in conducting their human experiments. 35 
The materials on the concentration camp experiments, as pre-
sented by Katz, question the law's purpose in hanging these scientists. 
If scientists and medical doctors had previously conducted experi-
ments, such as inducing syphilis to discover its exact cause, 36 
why is the military doctor held to a higher standard in the Nuremburg 
trials?37 But lawyers must reexamine this question carefully since the 
defendant's arguments of legal principle were ignored in the judgment. 
For instance, to refute the charge that his client had conducted "crim-
inal human experiments," one counsel made the following argument: 
No one will contend that human beings really allowed themselves 
to be infected voluntarily with venereal disease; this has nowhere 
been stated explicitly in literature. 
* * * 
It is repeatedly shown that the experiments for which no con-
sent was given were permitted with the full knowledge of the gov-
ernment authorities. It is further shown that these experiments 
were published in professional literature without meeting any objec-
tion, and that they were even accepted by the public without con-
cern as a normal phenomenon when reports about them appeared 
in popular magazines. 
* * * 
Voluntariness is a fiction; the emergency of the state hard reality.88 
Despite this line of argument, the judgment starts its pronounce-
ments of the "principles" of human experimentation with a require-
ment that "voluntary consent" is an absolute essential for human experi-
ments. 39 Without an articulated explication of why the particular form 
of utilitarianism (quoted above to justify the risking and taking of 
human lives at the time of war) was impermissible, the judges proceed 
to condemn some of the defendants to death and others to long terms 
34. Id. at 283. 
35. Id. at 306. 
36. Id. at 284-92. Given our retrospective condemnation of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study initiated in 1932 by the United States Public Health Service, I wonder if we 
can afford to suggest to ourselves that the research project was really proper for that 
time. HEW, FINAL REPORT OF THE TusKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY AD Hoc ADVISORY 
PANEL, 14-15 (1973). 
37. Cf. Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929, 932 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon, 
C.J., dissenting). 
38. KATZ at 304. 
39. Id. at 305. 
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of incarceration. 40 The case obviously raises difficult jurisprudential 
problems which I will not attempt to address here. 41 However, the 
failure of the decision to meet the defendant's arguments directly 
questions the supposition that lawyers should assume that the Nurem-
burg "principles" are appropriate starting points to solve all problems 
of human experimentation. The ease with which lawyers use the Nur-
emberg Code is disturbing. One wonders if the label of "Nazi concen-
tration camp experiments," so easily invoked by lawyers and doctors 
when there is a human experiment to condemn, 42 is not a way of jus-
tifying the law's failure to develop a systematic analysis of the prob-
lems of human experimentation. 
In raising these tough questions, Katz is motivated partly by a de-
sire to see law students face squarely the question of the efficacy of 
professional codes of ethics. Since the materials on experiments since 
World War IT demonstrate that clear ethical violations still occur,43 the 
reader becomes skeptical of the international and national codes of 
ethics. One might even go so far as to suggest that the professional 
codes are really means of ignoring the tough ethical questions of re-
search in both medical and social fields. As an educator, Katz ap-
pears to think that the most immediate answer lies in explicit modifi-
cation of the professional education at least of doctors and lawyers. 
Since society is without any well developed legal theories of control, it 
is apparently willing, through inaction, to delegate a great deal of 
authority to control human experimentation to the individual profes-
sions. 
After this rather jarring analysis, chapter six--on how the investi-
gator, as professional, should judge the consequences to the subject-
appears almost straightforward in its questioning. Given the two intro-
ductory case studies, it is not surprising that "harm" includes inter-
40. ld. at 306. 
41. The defendants' arguments might be met in two ways. First, the case might 
establish the principle of "consent" as a necessary element for therapeutic and experi-
mental intervention. Such justification for the punishment, however, does not indicate 
how defendants were to know of the principle's existence since it had been regularly 
violated. Second, despite the fact that consent may be called a "legal fiction," the 
concept promotes a number of goals, in defining law's relationship to the human ex-
perimentation process. Part three of the Katz book, dealing with the function of con-
sent and its limitations, might provide a starting point for such a theoretical justifica-
tion. See generally id. at 521-724. 
42. The lawyers and doctors involved in the "Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital 
Case" used the epithet quite frequently. See generally notes 11-12 and accompanying 
text supra. 
43. Id. at 306-21. 
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ferences with self-determination and privacy as well as threats to 
anonymity and reputation. 44 Since Katz is concerned with investiga-
tors of all kinds, his concern with investigative interferences with psy-
chological integrity appears quite natural. 45 He leaves the problem of 
interferences with physical integrity for last because this traditional con-
cern looks quite different after the other less traditional materials. 46 
If we could answer the questions he asks first, we might not be so ready 
to go immediately to the question of physical integrity. In the remain-
ing portions of the chapter, Katz shows an intellectual boldness (to 
which the reader has become accustomed) in the questions propounded. 
Should social researchers misrepresent their identities to gain informa-
tion?47 Can social researchers claim to have no values?48 
As might be expected in a book that integrates materials through 
questions, the reader must start facing multiple questions in chapter sev-
en. The questions in chapter six are relevant to the question of chap-
ter seven, "What Consequences to Society Should Affect the Authority 
of the Investigator?"49 While there are problems from human genetics 
and physical control of human behavior through brain surgery, two 
features of this ehapter demonstrate that Katz is willing to allow full 
exposure to all possible ideas. By publishing parts of an unpublished 
manuscript, Katz allows the reader to consider whether there is any justi-
fication for preventing an experimental hybridization of apes and man. 50 
Is the lawyer's only objection to this well-designed experiment the 
same as Blackstone's, that the result might be "a monster"?51 The 
second tour de force comes by reproducing the materials on the Dr. 
Mart in case 52 after materials from modem studies of sexual behavior 
by Masters and Johnson.53 If Dr. Martin, the therapist, is labelled 
criminal for "treating" young patients by performing sexual acts upon 
them, why are Masters and Johnson, the scientist-therapists, allowed 
to recruit surrogate female sexual partners for single impotent male 
patients in apparent violation of laws against prostitution?54 
44. ld. at 325-52. 
45. ld. at 338-68. 
46. ld. at 369-76. 
47. ld. at 428-29. 
48. ld. at 414-17. 
49. ld. at 435-520. 
50. ld. at 461-64. 
51. ld. at 464. 
52. ld. at 470-82 (reprinted from R. DoNNELLY, J. GOLDSTEIN, & R. ScHWARTZ, 
CRIMINAL LAW 11-28 (1962)). 
53. KATZ at 466-70. 
54. ld. at 469. Is it not predictable in light of chapter three, id. at 111-236, on 
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Part three might be viewed by some lawyers as the portion most 
relevant to legal studies since the problem of consent is addressed here 
in three chapters. The lawyer's search for firm ground, however, is dis-
pelled in the introduction to chapter eight: 
the concept of informed consent has been accepted in case and com-
mentary as a cardinal principle for judging the propriety of research 
with human beings. Yet law has neither defined sufficiently well 
the substance and ambit of informed consent in therapeutic settings 
nor determined clearly its functional relevance for human experi-
mentation. 55 
The reader must ask chapter eight's question, "What Are the Functions 
of Informed Consent?"56 as he examines the first large selection of 
cases and legal commentaries in the materials. If one .tries to reconcile 
the cases for the "law," one will be confused by suggestions that higher 
standards for consent should be imposed in therapeutic situations 
than in investigation. 57 
Strict adherence to the analytical structure makes chapter nine, 
"What Limitations Are Inherent in Informed Consent?", 58 quite inter-
esting since lawyers will understand Katz's point that we need a legal 
theory of consent. Such a legal theory, as pointed out earlier in the dis-
cussion of chapter four on decisionmaking, will not, however, be easy 
to formulate. 
One possible starting point in a search for a legal theory might be 
suggested by chapter ten's title of "What Limitation Should Be Im-
posed on Informed Consent?"59 Perhaps we might be able to deter-
mine the functions of consent in human experimentation by delineating 
the situations where consent will be prohibited by law or professional 
standards of ethics. Neither Katz nor I am hopeful that appropriate 
legal or professional standards can be readily achieved through such a 
process. The age-old problems of euthanasia60 and whether patients with 
fatal illnesses should be informed of their impending death61 are still 
there for resolution. As the reader finishes this chapter and part three, 
the interrelationship of man's quest for knowledge and professionalism, that the 
"sex experts," Masters and Johnson, want the medical profession to work towards pro-
fessional standards for sex therapists and a licensing law? See TIME, May 14, 1973, at 
72. 
55. KATZ at 523 (emphasis added). 
56. Id. at 523-608. 
51. Id. at 515. 
58. Id. at 609-73. 
59. Id. at 675-724. 
60. Id. at 702. 
61. Id. at 701. 
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he will realize that since chapter six the chapter titles have posed un-
answerable questions. 62 
The remaining four chapters, while not titled with questions, pre-
sent the truly difficult problems without any pretense of providing 
answers. Because of Katz's intense (some might think brutal) ques-
tioning to this point, the reader approaches the materials with newly ac-
quired objectivity. In chapter eleven, the lawyer reformulates the ques-
tion of whether law should intervene in the experimentation process by 
examining two medical case studies again. While we are accustomed 
to mitral valve surgery today, are we willing to endure a ninety-per-
cent failure rate in the development of new wonder cures?63 Before 
the reader answers, "yes", he ought to consider the effect on scientists 
and doctors of a stated national policy to "Conquer Heart Disease."64 
The reader might wonder if this national policy is not an implicit author-
ization to experiment with human beings. The other case study, the 
development of oral contraceptives through field studies in Puerto Rico, 
raises another issue. 65 Should legislation be drafted to prevent United 
States investigators from experimenting in foreign areas under fewer 
restrictions than allowed in the continental United States? Many 
other matters that are presently subject to public debate are presented 
in this chapter. Is legislation necessary to protect human subjects?66 
Should professionals try to control unethical research efforts by refus-
ing professional recognition to those who employ unethical research 
methods?67 
Chapter twelve, "Experimentation with Uncomprehending Sub-
jects,"68 also appears more timely than even Katz could have expected. 
Katz properly chose children as the example for study, knowing that the 
same analysis applied to "mentally ill" patients. 69 Children, instead of 
those labelled "mentally ill," are the appropriate starting point for law-
yers since, for many purposes, the law has traditionally viewed children 
as incapable of important decisionmaking. Contracts and criminal 
law are only ·two examples. However, to assume that there are adults 
who are unable to make proper legal decisions is a modem problem 
of a different complexion for law, although the problem has always 
62. ld. at xxiii-xxxiv. 
63. Id. at 802. 
64. Id. at 822. 
65. Id. at 742. 
66. See H.R. 7724, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
67. KATZ at 934. 
68. Id. at 955-1012. 
69. Id. at 956. 
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existed. The resolution of the latter problem will depend a great deal 
upon the ability of law to adapt and use in its decisionmaking newer 
scientific views of human beings. Before attempting to address this 
latter problem, it would behoove lawyers to understand the limitations 
of the law's treatment of the traditional problems of experimentation 
on children. In addition, lawyers should have a healthy skepticism of 
the scientific validity of all views of human behavior which are offered 
to authorize experiments on those human beings labelled "mentally ill." 
In suggesting that these studies raise questions of public policy as 
well as scientific merits, chapter twelve appears almost prophetic. The 
public, and now legislative committees, are concerned with the steriliza-
tion of young girls by governmentally funded agencies. 70 But Katz's 
analysis is even broader than most public discussion since he includes 
within his discussion the issues of fetal research71 and cloning72 in 
his questions about the uncomprehending subjects. Both the fetus and 
the cloned man are uncomprehending subjects because they do not yet 
exist to consent to participation in the experiment. If pending legisla-
tion prohibiting fetal research is passed, 73 lawyers might find sys-
tematic study of this material essential. Legal decisionmakers may 
have to decide if such legislation is constitutional. 74 More importantly, 
lawyers will have to make their own value choices as to whether such 
legislation is desirable. 
Chapter thirteen, "Experimentation with Captive Subjects,"75 al-
though containing only a few selections from law, presents the greatest 
challenge to law. While discussing the problems of experimentation on 
soldiers, the materials also comment upon experimentation on prisoners, 
who now loom large in the public conscience.76 I would suggest 
70. The Involuntary Sterilization of Minors, 10 MEDICAL-MORAL NEWSLETIER 
(1973). 
71. KATZ at 976. 
72. ld. at 977-79. 
73. See 119 CONG. REc. 16349 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1973) (proposal to limit fetal 
experimentation until Institutional Review Boards have been established). 
74. If the recent Supreme Court opinion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), pro-
hibiting criminal sanctions and limiting state regulations on abortions is analyzed in 
terms of "substantive due process," can a complete prohibition on fetal research be 
viewed as "arbitrary action" in violation of due process? Cf. Tribe, Foreword: 
Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 
52 n.229 (1973). 
75. KATZ at 1013-52. 
76. Perhaps we ought to consider more seriously the social effects of increasing 
the numbers of persons under direct state control through compulsory national service 
programs. Id. at 1026. 
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that our scientific or medical view of man, i.e. that the criminal can 
be rehabilitated or treated, has led to a dilemma. 77 Our correc-
tional administrators, those most likely to formulate research policies for 
prisoners, are increasingly trained in this view of man's misbehavior. 
Thus scientists share a common value structure with those the law has 
authorized to "·treat" or control prisoners. At the same time there are 
few if any legal rules that attempt to limit the authority of correctional 
administrators or to alter their view of the human beings under their 
direct control. Given the "lawlessness" of corrective practices, 78 I would 
not be optimistic about law's having much effect upon human experi-
mentation in prison. A few dramatic cases might catch public atten-
tion for a short while. But I wonder if administrators, acting in good 
faith, and without legal guidance, might employ experimental tech-
niques of various kinds. 79 I also wonder if society wants the experimen-
tation in prison to go on as a way of finding out why we label persons 
criminal. 80 
Chapter fourteen, "Experimentation with Dying Subjects,"81 or-
dinarily a quite controversial topic, ends this book in a surprisingly sob-
ering manner. From ·the first introductory case study, the reader 
knows that this kind of experimentation is a continuing practice and 
now should see the many themes of the book come together. We al-
ways publicly applaud the doctors who successfully transplant kidneys, 
hearts, and other organs. But we are unwilling to make judgments 
about the high costs, economic and social, of such spectacular medical 
cures. 82 Do people in our society readily support a great scientific 
venture to save a human life, but ignore the poor quality of medical 
service delivered to the rest of the community?83 Will the society allow 
the medical professional to answer the previous question, as lawyers are 
doing, by experimenting with redefinitions of their professional obliga-
tions?84 Or will legislative attempts to regulate the transplantation 
of organs or to define death, in effect, obscure the important questions 
77. A. Goldstein, Introduction to L. ORLAND, JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT 
xxv-xxvi (1973). 
78. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
79. Why shouldn't a correctional-dispositional official of a state treatment center 
for addicts, in good faith, seek authorization for a limited experiment in heroin mainte-
nance if current legal analysis views heroin addiction as "an illness"? Cf. Robinson 
v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See also note 90 infra. 
80- KATZ at 1037. 
81. ld. at 1053-108. 
82. Id. at 1069. 
83. ld. at 1070. 
84. See text accompanying note 31 supra. 
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of public policy?85 In attempting to formulate an answer to the last 
question, the reader might refer back to questions in the introduction 
and specifically questions 6a and 6b quoted in the text above. 86 
EPILOGUE 
To return to .the questions of the typical lawyer (i.e. is this book 
a contribution to the field of "Legal Medicine" or "Law and Medi-
cine") the answer is that Katz's book creates a new "field" for the 
law school curriculum. While it might be used in courses or seminars 
in "Law and Medicine," it would do some damage to the intellectual 
structure of the book not to take it on its own terms. This book should 
be used for a new experiment in legal education-teaching students 
about ·the human experimentation process. This book does more than 
mix legal and nonlegal materials together; consequently, it is beyond 
categorization as interdisciplinary. Because of its excellent analytical 
table of contents, variety of materials, table of cases, table of authors, 
and table of books, articles, and other sources, 87 this book is the start-
ing point for legal research in the human experimentation process. It 
can be used either in courses or in seminars, but the teacher will have 
to experiment with selections. 
Katz, a psychiatrist who has taught in law school for many years, 
is the co-author of other law school texts, 88 and has spent nearly a 
decade creating this masterpiece. The book was designed to be used 
in the professional training of lawyers, as well as doctors and scientists. 
As such it raises problems in professional ethics, criminal law, torts, 
contracts, social values, and jurisprudence. Such problems are all 
part of the formulations of professional and legal standards that Katz, 
in true scholarly fashion, thinks are possible only after systematic study. 
The law teacher and law students undertaking a study of this book will 
find the unanswerable questioning quite disturbing. As lawyers, we 
are expected to have answers to most difficult social problems, and 
Katz dares to suggest that for many of the most important ones we do 
not. 
It is hard to explain my sense of hope after reading this book 
85. Cf. Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining 
Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87 (1972). See also 
KATZ at 1090-91. 
86. See text accompanying note 9 supra. 
87. KATZ at 1127. 
88. J. GoLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAw (1965); J. KATZ, J. 
GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1967). 
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about "man's inhumanity to man."89 I am optimistic about our ability 
to solve some of the existing and rapidly emerging problems of human 
experimentation. This optimism stems from my belief that the world 
will be "better" if the society's professionals are equipped in their train-
ing with a deep intellectual understanding of the problems that society 
has faced and will probably face during their professional lifetime. If 
heresy were defined as thinking the unthinkable, then heresy confronts 
the reader of Katz's work. The reason that I find Katz's approach so 
appealing is that the crime of heresy runs rampant throughout the book. 
If you are prepared to question or at least cross-examine propo-
sitions like the following: 
1. Human Experimentation involves solely questions of physical 
intrusions into the human body. 
2. Law is not a form of human experimentation. 
3. Empirical research in law is not only desirable, but must be 
pursued vigorously and without limitation. 
4. The judgments in the case of Nazi physicians and scientists 
at Nuremburg provide starting points for legal standards for 
human experimentations. 90 
89. KATZ at 5. 
90. A special three judge court in Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 
Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Mich., July 10, 1973 ), used the Nuremberg judgment 
to support its conclusion that an involuntarily detained mental patient cannot give his 
consent to an "experimental psychosurgery" operation. !d. at 23-25. One wonders if 
the court's conclusion is based partially on the view that those who are "captives" and 
"mentally ill" are too incompetent to "consent" at all. Such a use of the Nuremburg 
judgment is somewhat surprising since it did not address the issue of when experiments 
were permissible if we view the subjects as uncomprehending and thus unable to "con-
sent." See text accompanying note 38 supra. A host of other issues-the "standing" of 
the legal services lawyer to bring the suit, whether the consent form used was inade-
quate by some standard, id. at 4, and whether the review mechanisms used to select the 
first patient-subject were defective, id. at 3-are all worthy of scholarly discussion. 
The case was well reported in the national press. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1973, 
at 26, col. 1. It is hoped that the full opinion and appendix are made available in pub-
lished form so that scholars generally will have the opportunity to discuss this case. 
I wonder, however, if a tougher question might be troubling the court, the legal 
decisionmakers. Is invoking the obvious moral rightness of the "Nuremberg Judgment" 
a way of not examining the law's purpose in confining the patient-subject? After all, 
a careful reading of the facts reveals that the patient-subject had been charged with the 
murder and rape of a nurse at a state mental hospital where he had been confined 
17 years. !d. at 2. He had originally been confined in the state mental hospitals under 
the state's criminal sexual psychopath statute. Was this seventeen year confinement a 
means of confining the patient-subject in a situation where we could not justify, con· 
sistent with other principles of law, confining him for the murder and rape? Cf. Gold-
stein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963). 
I raise the question for two reasons. It appears arguably "logical" to try radical and 
"experimental" techniques after seventeen-plus years of trying to "treat" unsuccessfully. 
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5. Informed consent is the primary legal determination to be 
made in analyzing the legal problems posed by human experi-
mentation. 
6. Improving the professional training of lawyers to meet their 
professional responsibility might best be achieved by increas-
ing law students' contact with human subject-clients. 
you will find this book immensely valuable in teaching one set of high 
priests, law students. 
Katz's major mistake, in my opinion, is that he wrote a law 
school text that intelligent laymen can 'l'ead, understand, and enjoy. 
What will we lawyers do if non-experts understand our inadequacies in 
an important area like human experimentation? Will they look tooth-
ers for leadership? How can we, the high priests of social problems, 
let the non-priests know that our expertise leads us to the following ans-
wer: It all started with Eve when she ate the apple. We should not 
blame her for our present troubles, after all the apple was there to be 
tested. Some readers might find the length of this book somewhat 
troublesome, but I do not. It is all so good, much like Eve's apple. 
Second, if we take Katz's perspective of viewing the problems of human experimenta-
tion as a process, we must start asking the questions of what forces provide the 
impetus to "experiment with human beings"? 
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